This analysis tests the price discovery relationship between sovereign CDS premia and bond yield spreads on the same reference entity for six Euro-area countries over the period [2004][2005][2006][2007][2008][2009][2010][2011]. We nd that in each country the CDS and bond spreads series are bound by a cointegration relationship. The theoretical value [1, -1] for the cointegrating vector is rejected, allowing for short run price discrepancies between the two markets. The VECM analysis suggests that the CDS market leads price discovery. The Granger Causality Test shows that for 5/6 of the countries, past values of CDS spreads help to forecast bond yield spreads. *
The credit default swaps (CDS) market has drown increasing attention from practitioners, regulators, and even politicians. Yet much of the existing research used data from the early period of the markets' development, and there is little focus on the segment of greatest policy interest, the Euro-area sovereign bond market.
As Due (1999) and related literature point out, a theoretical no-arbitrage condition between the cash and synthetic price of credit risk should drive investment decisions and tie up the two credit spreads in the long run. Insofar as credit risk is what they price, cash and synthetic market prices should reect an equal valuation, in equilibrium. If in the short run they are aected by factors other than credit risk, such elements may partially obscure the comovement between bond yield spreads and CDS premia.
The rst contribution of this study lies in checking the accuracy of credit risk pricing in the CDS market by comparing the theoretically implied CDS premia with the one established by the market. The existence of a stable cointegration relationship between the two credit spreads implies a statistically signicant long-run connection between bonds and CDS contracts on the same reference entity. On the one hand, this rules out the possibility that credit risk is priced in unrelated ways in the derivative and cash market. On the other, we cannot discard the hypothesis that large common pricing components rather than credit risk aect both prices to some extent.
As a second contribution, we address the relative eciency of credit risk pricing in the bond and CDS market. In order to explore the price discovery relationship between CDS and bond yield spreads, we estimate a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM). We proceed in three steps: rst, we apply a set of unit-root tests for each bond yield spread and CDS premia series. If the credit spreads are integrated of order one at the 5% level, for each country in the sample we test for cointegration to determine if bond yield spreads and CDS premia move together in the long run. If the cointegration hypothesis is not rejected at the 5% level, we then estimate a Vector Error Correction Model to investigate whether the CDS market can anticipate the bond market in pricing, or merely adapts to the cash market valuation of credit risk.
Several recent papers study the credit derivative markets. The majority focus on CDS contracts written on corporate bonds, 1 and their data do not cover the past several years, in which the CDS market grew rapidly and then went through the nancial crisis. Of the few papers devoted to the study of sovereign CDS spreads, most focus on emerging markets. We know of only two papers on sovereign credit risk in the European Union based on CDS market data.
2 The size of the markets, the intrinsic interest of the recent period, and the policy relevance of CDS market performance would seem to justify further work with a dierent approach.
The most relevant studies following the accuracy and eciency dimensions of credit risk are Zhu (2006) and Ammer and Cai (2011) . Zhu examines how CDS spreads interact with bond rates, using daily data of corporate names over the period [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] . His analysis conrms that the long-run parity condition holds in the data for corporate reference entities, even though short-run price discrepancies can exist between the two markets. VECM analysis shows that the derivative market moves ahead of the bond market in terms of price discovery. . Their country sample and approach dier from ours. They apply a statistical arbitrage test (Hogan, Teo, and Warachka, 2004) on the CDS-bond basis trying to assess whether the existence of a non-zero basis has either to be seen as a consequence of market frictions or has to be understood as an opportunity for arbitrage. In their price discovery analysis, they use rolling windows estimation, while we apply a static price discovery metric. Our results are not directly comparable.
A. Fontana and M. Scheicher (2010) . They focus on ten EU countries over the period 2006-2010. They do regression analysis to investigate the determinants of the sovereign CDS-bond basis. This is a rather dierent perspective. In addition, they apply VECM framework to 10 year bond and CDS series to investigate their price discovery relation. They split their sample into pre and post crisis, hence producing results not directly comparable to ours, as we decided not to break up the sample period (see discussion below). Ammer and Cai (2011) nd that the parity relationship between the two credit spreads holds for a sample of nine emerging market economies over the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . They provide no conclusive evidence regarding which market leads price discovery, but they argue that the relatively more liquid market tends to lead.
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Our study similarly brings the theoretical parity relation between CDS and bond spreads to the data, but it diers from their papers in several ways. First, we cover a substantially longer and more recent period than does Zhu (2004 Zhu ( -2010 Zhu ( vs. 1999 Zhu ( -2002 . We include in the analysis the period of the maturity of CDS market, 4 and we extend the analysis over the current nancial crisis. Although the theoretical framework we refer to is similar to that of Zhu (2006) , we examine the Eurozone credit risk, an issue largely ignored until spring 2010.
Compared to Ammer and Cai (2011), we also focus the analysis on sovereign debt, but we refer to credit risk in developed economies. Our results seem to convey a more clear-cut picture of the role of the CDS market in sovereign credit risk pricing. Our principal results are as follows. There is clear evidence that CDS and bond yield spreads diverge substantially in the short run. VECM results suggest that this may be attributed largely to a dierent timing of response to new information available in the short run. Nonetheless, cointegration analysis supports the long-run price accuracy of CDS relative to the underlying bond market, suggesting long-run equilibrium between the two credit prices.
In the baseline VECM estimation with two lags, four out of six countries in the sample show 3 Ammer and Cai show that the Gonzalo and Granger measure of CDS price leadership is positively correlated with the ratio of the bond bid-ask spread, to CDS bid-ask spread and negatively with the number of bonds outstanding, respectively a proxy for relative and collective bond market liquidity. Arce, Mayordomo and Pena nd that price discovery is state-dependent, and they argue that market liquidity is a signicant factor in determining which market leads price discovery. 4 According to the International Swap and Derivative Association (ISDA) Market Survey (2008), after 2003 the CDS market reached its maturity, characterized by a rapid growth, and by the shift in its primary use from hedging to speculation. The global notional amount of CDS contracts outstanding started to fall only after a series of large scale incidents in 2008, beginning with the failure of Bear Stearns. the existence of a signicant two-way price interaction between the CDS and the underlying bond markets. For these countries, the CDS market reacts relatively more quickly to changes in credit conditions. For the remaining two sovereigns in the sample, we observe a one-way credit risk pricing dynamic where information is essentially revealed in the CDS market, and the cash market adjusts to eliminate deviations from the long-run equilibrium.
Short-term deviations are not only substantial, they also show surprising persistence. On average, only 2% of price discrepancies are eliminated within two business days. This suggests rigidities in one or both markets.
Some of the conclusions of our study are surprisingly similar to those in Blanco et al. (2005) , even though they focus on corporate credit risk, they include US reference entities, and they focus on data from 2001-2002, before the real boom of the European CDS market.
Section I provides a market overview and introduces the theoretical pricing framework. Section II describes the econometric methodology and summarizes the empirical results. Section III concludes.
I. The CDS Market

A. Pricing Framework and Related Literature
This study relates to a specic branch of the literature on credit risk pricing based on the approximate arbitrage relationship between CDS prices and credit spreads for a given reference entity. According to Due (1999) , elaborated by Hull and White (2003) , there is a perfect arbitrage opportunity between a risky bond traded at par, a riskless par bond, and a CDS contract of the corresponding maturity. Under certain assumptions, the price of a CDS contract can always be deduced from the asset swap spread of a bond. Specically, one needs to assume no frictions to short-selling the risky bond in the repo market, and that the recovery rate of a defaulted bond is zero. A rigorous theoretical measure of CDS spreads would require an estimate of the risk-neutral probability that the underlying bond defaults at dierent future times and an estimate of the recovery rate in case of default. Making use of this loose proximate arbitrage relation instead allows us to provide an approximate upper bound to the true CDS spread. Given the assumption of zero recovery rate in case of default, our estimate of the true spread is always biased upwards. Following the same logic, our estimates of the yield to maturity on the bond can be seen as a lower bound to the true one, as we are not taking into account the cost associated with shorting the risky asset.
Under these assumptions, the annual yield of a risk-free bond must be equal, in equilibrium, to the dierence between the annual yield of the corresponding risky bond and the cost of credit protection expressed as a percentage of the risky bond nominal value.
5 If the annual premium paid in the CDS market for credit protection is CDS spread and the annual yield of the risky and risk-free bond are respectively BY and BY rf , then:
Whenever BY rf > BY − CDS spread investors would make a prot buying the risk-free product, shorting the risky bond and selling protection in the CDS market. If BY rf < BY − CDS spread , then buying a risky bond, buying protection on it in the CDS market and shorting the risk-free bond would be protable.
The same condition can be expressed in terms of the basis. The bond-CDS basis is the dierence between the CDS spread and the bond yield spread on the same reference entity, 5 Due originally used LIBOR as the risk free rate, whereas Hull and White used US Treasuries as the riskless benchmark.
dened as the spread of a risky bond over a risk-free bond of the same maturity. Based on the previous relation, and assuming perfect arbitrage between the cash and synthetic market, the basis should equal zero in equilibrium:
For this theoretical arbitrage relation to hold, each parameter of the two bonds must be identical, and we must disregard the counterparty risk associated with CDS contracts, i.e., the possibility that the protection seller might be unable to make payment in case of a default event.
The CDS rates express exactly the credit spread of the reference entity over the spot interest rate. It is trivial, but there could not be an approximate arbitrage relationship with bond yield spreads otherwise. At the same time, CDS rates are averages across CDS quoted prices. In order to rule out the possibility that the CDS spread series are aected by a mean reverting component we conducted a Garch analysis. The Garch model parameter estimates sum to 1, showing that CDS and bond yield spreads are not characterized by a mean reverting variance process.
The intrinsic diculty of quantifying repo costs and counterparty risk would seem to justify the choice of this simplied approach. This method is most often used by market practitioners to determine theoretical prices. It is often referred to as the No Arbitrage approach. Another consideration is that several non-fundamental factors seem to have an impact on CDS prices, among which liquidity premia, rating agencies' outlooks and speculative behaviour may play a non-trivial role. Providing an accurate representation of the true theoretical relationship betweeen bond and CDS prices would require netting out the eect of any large common factor that aects bond and CDS pricing. This goes beyond the scope of our study, which aims at describing how new available pricing information is received in the two markets, regardless how noisy such information is. The choice of our method seems consistent with our intended limited objective. They nd that CDS premia and bond yield spreads are linked by a stable linear long-run equilibrium relation. In the short run, they cannot conclude which of the two markets leads price discovery, although they suggest that the most liquid market tends to lead.
Another strand in the literature has focused on credit risk in the European Union, even though evidence for European credit markets is so far limited. A number of studies have focused on government bond spreads in the EU, 
B. Terms of a Typical CDS Contract
CDS are over the counter (OTC) nancial instruments that oer investors a very high degree of exibility. CDS contracts transfer the credit risk associated with corporate or sovereign bonds to a third party, without shifting any other risks associated with such bonds or loans.
6 Some CDS contracts provide investors with the right to deliver dierent grades of the underlying asset. This happens when the reference entity has more than one long-term debt instrument outstanding that matches the debt seniority specied in the contract. This mechanism is known as the Cheapest to Deliver (CTD) option. It is considered to be one of the concurrent elements pushing CDS spreads above bond yield spreads in the short run. There can always be an incentive to deliver the lowest-priced instrument that the protection buyer can convey, according to its contractual clauses. 
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The theoretical use of a CDS contract is to provide insurance against unexpected losses due to a default by a corporate or sovereign entity. The debt issuer is known as the reference entity, and a default or restructuring on the predened debt contract is known as a credit event. In the most general terms, it is a bilateral deal where a protection buyer pays a periodic xed premium, 12 Since the Eurozone 8 The Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC) announced in October 2008 its intention to make public the information regarding the notional amounts of CDS transactions registered in its Trade Information Warehouse. Weekly updated free of charge data streams are now available to the public: www.dtcc.com/products/derivserv/data/index.php. 9 Usually paid quarterly in arrears. 10 For an overview on the role of liquidity in sovereign CDS pricing see Ammer and Cai (2011). 13 Hedge funds, global investment banks and non-resident fund managers seem to be the most active participants in the market.
14 Before the introduction of credit derivatives, there was no way to isolate credit risk from the underlying bond or loan, and there was no such concept as credit basis , which is, by denition, the dierence between the return on a cash asset and the synthetic form of the same asset. While theory predicts that cash and derivative market price of the same asset should be the same, dierences in asset quality and a number of other technical factors imply that a non-zero basis is normal. Thus the credit basis is used to search for arbitrage opportunities. Basis trades involve holding a simultaneous position on the same asset both in the cash and the derivative market. Such an investment strategy aims at exploiting any short term price dierences between the cash and synthetic markets to make risk-free prots.
Prior to the expiration of the derivative contract, the basis can be positive or negative. In the simple case of a xed-coupon bond hedged via CDS, when the cash market price increases by more than the derivative price, the basis increases. Therefore, the basis turns positive when the risk premium on the risky bond is too low or the CDS spread is too high. A positive basis can be adjusted back to zero by short selling the risky bond, but this could take some time due to the rigidities in the cash market, implying that the basis could remain positive persistently. On the other hand, the CDS-bond basis decreases when the derivative market price increases by more than the spot price. The basis turns negative when the credit risk premium on a risky bond is higher than its theoretical value, or the CDS spread is too low.
13 Source: DTCC. 14 Report on Sovereign CDS (2010) http://ft.com/CDSreport.
In this latter case, arbitrage is easier to conduct: a negative basis can be adjusted back to zero faster by short-selling the risk-free bond.
Rather than hedging, a CDS contract can be used for speculative purposes by an investor who does not own any debt to hedge. 
C. Basis Trends and Basis Drivers
The existence of a long run parity relationship between bond yield spreads and CDS spreads is a testable hypothesis. For the theoretical no-arbitrage condition to hold, either the basis should cluster around zero in the data, or it should converge to zero in a longer time horizon. For instance when Lehman Brothers went bankrupt, it had approximately 155 billion USD of outstanding debt, but twice as much notional value of CDS contracts written on its debt, meaning that many investors had entered CDS contracts for speculative reasons. 16 R. Portes (2010) .
has remained positive for ve out of six countries in the sample, with the sole exception of Greece; the country means range from 9 to 21 basis points.
The apparent stability of our results is striking in view of the behaviour of spreads in Figures   1-6 . It seems that market behaviour has changed in most countries over the sample period, the discriminant being the advent of the nancial crisis. But the dating of the divergences dier across countries. And the CDS and bond yield spread series seem to be moving together over the whole sample period, regardless of such regime shifts.
The size of the CDS-bond basis provides a rough measure of the gain arising from arbitrage opportunities that can result from pricing ineciencies in the credit market. It is important to notice that the logic behind basis trading is that investors actually expect the basis to uctuate signicantly away from zero. For example, if the basis is positive, the standard arbitrage trade is to sell the basis, which means sell the cash bond and sell protection on it on the CDS market. The gain arises from the fact that if the credit quality of the reference entity improves (and the basis gets narrow) no protection payment will be executed, while the protection seller prots from the ow of CDS premia payments. No signicant arbitrage prot can be gained if the basis remains stable or uctuates close to zero. On the other side, if the basis is negative, the potential arbitrage trade is to buy the basis, which means to buy the cash bond and buy protection on it on the CDS market. Again, the protability of the trade is linked to worsening in the credit quality of the reference entity. Upon default, the protection buyer gets compensation from the protection seller. If no credit event occurs, he can still resell the protection on the reference asset at a higher rate, as the reference entity is now considered riskier. It is possible that once a non-zero basis is established in the market, the dynamics of basis trades may contribute to keep it away from its theoretical value. Strong market demand from protection buyers will drive the basis upwards, while strong market supply from protection sellers will drive the basis down.
The (ii) The Cheapest to Deliver (CTD) option embodied in many physically settled CDS contracts may aect the basis, although the impact of this factor might be small for sovereign CDS, because they are more frequently settled in cash.
(iii) In certain cases, the accrued coupon on the reference bond is also delivered to the protection buyer in case of default; nevertheless, this is not the norm. The positive bias deriving from this factor is likely to be small.
(iv) If the reference bond of a CDS contract is trading below par, in case of default the protection seller will experience a greater loss compared to an investor who holds the asset in the cash form. This is because upon default the protection seller will have to pay out the par value minus the asset price at the time of default. This might bias the basis spread upwards.
(v) For illiquid segments of the CDS market, protection sellers may charge a premium which drives the basis upwards. Protection sellers may in fact be seen as liquidity providers to the market in times of nancial distress, when reference entities may default on their debt.
Among the factors that may lead to a negative basis, we have:
(i) Counterparty risk: the protection buyer takes on the risk that the protection seller will not be able to fulll his commitment to deliver a compensation payment in case a credit event occurs. The protection seller is also exposed to counterparty risk, but if the buyer defaults, the CDS contract is terminated, leaving the size of this risk negligible for the seller.
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(ii) There may be a liquidity premium in either the bond or the CDS market, and if the market for the risky bond is (plausibly) less liquid than the market for risk-free bonds, this might increase bond yield spreads, driving the basis negative.
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All factors that aect more the risk prole of the CDS contract tend to increase the basis, while factors that appear to aect more the creditworthiness of the bond relative to the CDS will drive the basis down. Any factor that may increase the return of the bond relative to the CDS contract can drive the basis upwards, and equally depress the basis if it tends to increase the relative return of the CDS.
II. Empirical Analysis
A. Data All the sovereign CDS premia are averages across dierent CDS dealers. CMA partner agencies collect daily quote information and then average them to provide a single daily 19 Arce, Mayordomo, and Pena (2011) include Spain nevertheless. 
B. Cointegration Analysis
To examine the long term consistency between CDS premia and bond yield spreads we proceed in two steps. First, a cointegration check is performed. CDS rates and bond yield spreads for which a cointegrated relationship holds can be used in the Vector Error Correction
Model (VECM) representation to test the relative price eciency of the cash and derivative
markets. An issue we need to deal with in our dataset is the potential structural break introduced in our data by the nancial crisis that began in autumn 2008. Perron (1989) was the rst to argue that stationary models with structural breaks could easily be confused with unit root models. Unit root tests that do not account for possible breaks in the series are known to have low power.
21 There is no consensus yet on the reliability of the results of standard unit root tests in presence of potential multiple breaks in the data. Moreover, non-stationarity aects the results of tests for a structural break. For each country, the null hypothesis of a unit root is not rejected at the 5% percent level for both the CDS premium and bond yield spread series across the dierent test specications.
In addition, the basis spread is found to be stationary at the 99% condence level for Austria, Ireland and Italy, at the 95% level for Belgium and Portugal, and at the 90% level for
Greece. The second step of the analysis examines whether the two credit spreads are cointegrated. Any equilibrium theories that involve bond and CDS spreads require a combination of such variables to be stationary; otherwise, any deviation from the equilibrium will not be temporary. On the other hand, if CDS premia and bond yield spreads do not cointegrate, it implies that the two spreads can, in fact, move in unrelated ways over the long run, and credit risk pricing in the two markets may be signicantly dierent.
For each country in the sample, we estimate the following cointegration equation:
CDSspread t = α + βBY spread t + ε t 23 Performing also the Engle and Granger test should give a more robust performance. Table III and Table IV 
C. Vector Error Correction Model (VECM)
The non-zero basis that we observe in the data proves that not all the information relevant to the valuation of credit risk is completely reected in the short-run pricing dynamics in the cash and derivative markets. This suggests a market ineciency, leading us to ask which market reacts more promptly to signals perceived as informative of the underlying sovereign entity's credit standing. In particular, it is not known whether credit risk is priced according to a two-way dynamic, where both cash and synthetic market information content is valued;
or whether, alternatively, price discovery is always driven by one market, and the other merely adjusts, bringing no real contribution to the equilibrium price assigned to sovereign default risk. When we nd evidence of both markets contributing to price discovery, we try to assess the relative speed of adjustment of the two credit spreads. Alternatively, we observe a one-way price discovery process where all perceived information regarding credit risk is rst revealed in one market. Since the leading market in price discovery provides the most up to date information about the perceived level of credit risk, in this sense it is the more ecient in its pricing. Prices in the more liquid market should be quicker to reect public information. However, such information can be characterized by a signicant transitory noise that is ultimately incorporated in CDS spreads.
The VECM is a linear representation of the stochastic data generation process. Each of the variables in the model is considered endogenous, comprising two components: a linear function of the past realizations of all variables in the system, 24 and an unpredictable innovation component. In the Error Correction setting, the changes in a variable are modeled depending on the deviation from some equilibrium relation, whose form is described by the cointegrating vector. The Error Correction term is in fact an expression in a and b that corresponds 24 Including a variable's own lagged values.
to the same parameters in the Johansen Cointegration analysis.
The cointegration vector
is itself an expression of the long-run relationship between CDS and bond yield spreads in levels. The adjustment coecients estimate to what extent the error is corrected each period, and therefore they provide a measure of the relative speed of adjustment of bond and CDS markets towards the long run equilibrium.
The VEC representation of the model is:
where CDS t and BY S t stand for CDS spreads and bond yield spreads at time t, and ε 1t and ε 2t are i.i.d. shocks. The rst term is the error correction mechanism through which the credit spreads evolve in the bond and CDS markets to adjust in the long run. It can be seen as the error from the long term equilibrium relation.
According to our model specication, [-,+] are the expected set of signs for the adjustment coecients λ 1 and λ 2 which imply that both credit spreads contribute to the error correction mechanism. If both the estimated adjustment coecients are statistically signicant, we can infer that there is a signicant price interaction between the bond and CDS market.
If one market always lags the other, then the coecient in the equation for the market that always leads price discovery should be not signicantly dierent from zero. If λ 1 is negative and signicant, it means that the CDS market adjusts to remove pricing errors, meaning that the bond market prices credit risk rst. If λ 2 is signicant and positive, it 25 When α=0 and β=1, the rst term in the model becomes the rst lag of the basis spread.
means that the cash market adjusts, and the CDS market is quicker in reecting changes in the credit conditions of the underlying reference entities. If both coecients are signicant and with the proper sign, the relative magnitude of the adjustment coecients determines the relative importance of each market in price discovery. The more reactive market is the more ecient in terms of credit risk pricing. Table V shows our VECM results. For Austria, Belgium, Greece and Italy, the price discovery turns out to be a two-way pattern, overall directed by the derivative market. Both adjustment coecients show statistically signicant estimates, with the required set of signs. The λ 1 coecient estimate is not statistically signicant for Ireland and Portugal, meaning that for these countries credit risk is priced in the CDS market rst, and the underlying bond market adjusts. Overall, there is evidence that the CDS market tends to lead the bond market in price discovery.
The VECM regression is estimated allowing parameters a and b to be freely determined within the model. For all the six sovereign names in the sample, the estimate of b is slightly but signicantly dierent from 1: it ranges from 0.8 to 1.89, consistent with the presence of short term pricing discrepancies. These deviations exhibit considerable persistence: on average only around 2% of price discrepancies is eliminated within two business days.
Following Ammer and Cai (2011), we refer to λ 2 λ 2 −λ 1 , the Gonzalo and Granger (1995) measure, to assess the relative contribution of each market to price discovery. It corresponds to the ratio of the speeds of adjustment of the two markets. According to the way we specied the Error Correction Representation of the model, when the Gonzalo and Granger measure is close to 1, it means that the CDS market leads the price discovery, and the bond market follows to correct for pricing discrepancies. When it is close to 50%, both markets contribute approximately equally to price discovery. When it is close to 0, the bond market leads the derivative market. The average ratio of 0.61 over the sovereigns for which we discovered a two-way price relationship suggests that the CDS market leads somewhat more than it adjusts.
26 It is important to stress that the present analysis is conducted over the most liquid part of the CDS curve, i.e. the 5-year segment. When the desired liquidity requirements are matched, the CDS market tends to be more ecient than its cash counterpart in pricing credit risk.
D. Granger Causality Test
In order to get stronger evidence of which market leads price discovery, we also perform a pairwise Granger Causality test over each set of CDS premia and bond yield spreads in the sample. Note, however, that Granger causality testing results may be partially aected by the non-normality of the underlying residuals.
The Granger hypothesis is used to infer whether the cash market helps to predict the pricing of credit risk in the derivative market, or the relation between the two credit spreads goes the other way round. Granger causality does not imply true causality. If CDS spreads Grangercause bond yield spreads, then past values of CDS premia should contain information that helps predict bond spreads beyond the information contained in past values of bond yield spreads alone.
There are several ways to test for Granger causality. Here, we consider the simplest case of bivariate Granger causality.
27 Formally it means estimating the following regression:
26 But the estimated standard error of the ratio is 0.22, so that it is not in fact signicantly dierent from 0.5. We do take the 0.61 value as suggestive, however. 27 The test results are more valuable when the two markets under analysis do not show a two-way relationship, as they do for four of our six countries. The Granger Causality test results must then be interpreted with additional care, and they need to be confronted with the VECM analysis.
for a particular lag length p, that can be estimated by OLS. Then conduct an F-test on the null hypothesis H0: β 1 = . . . =β p = 0. If the statistic exceeds the 5% critical value, the null hypothesis of absence of Granger Causality is rejected. Table VI shows the Granger-Causality test results over a two-day horizon. For Greece, Ireland, and Italy, past values of CDS spreads help predict the price of credit risk in the bond market. For Belgium and Portugal the test shows Granger-causality working through both directions; nonetheless, we can reject the null hypothesis of CDS spread not Granger causal for bond yield spreads with a higher level of signicance, meaning that the CDS role in forecasting bond yield spreads seems conrmed. The Granger causality test for Austria shows a one way Granger-causality driven by bond yield spreads. This contradicting result may be an indication that the Granger causality modeling is particularly sensitive to the existence of a two-way price relationship, and to the non normality of the underlying distribution, leading at times to inconsistent results.
III. Conclusion
The rapid expansion of the CDS market over the last decade represents one of the most interesting recent developments in nancial markets. Its fast growth in volume, as well as its role in the current nancial crisis, indicate the importance of studying this nancial product.
Since both CDS and bond contracts on the same reference entity oer compensation for the same credit risk, their price should be equal in equilibrium. To explore their long term relationship, as a rst step, the supposed non stationary of the two series is veried. For each country in the sample, the null hypothesis of a unit root in the CDS and bond yield spread series is not rejected at the 5% level. In a second step, we verify whether the non stationary CDS and bond spreads series are bound by a cointegration relationship. For all countries in the sample, the null hypothesis of no cointegration between CDS premia and bond yield spreads is rejected at the 5% level. Overall the cointegration analysis conrms that the two prices should be equal to each other in long-run equilibrium, as theory predicts.
One interpretation is that the derivative market prices credit risk correctly: sovereign CDS contracts written on Euro area borrowers seem to be able to provide new up to date information to sovereign cash market during the period 2004-2011. The theoretical value [1, -1] for the cointegrating vector is overall rejected, however, meaning that in the short run the cash and synthetic markets price credit risk dierently to various degrees. Note also that even if the CDS market prices credit risk correctly in the long run, that does not mean that credit risk as priced by either the CDS or the cash market reects fundamentals.
The VECM analysis suggests that, in general, the derivative market moves ahead of the bond market in price discovery. This goes in line with the results of Zhu (2006) , but contrasts with Ammer and Cai (2011) , suggesting that the dynamics for developing and developed economies may be very dierent as far as sovereign credit risk is concerned. According to our ndings, Eurozone sovereign risk seems to behave closer to developed countries' corporate credit risk than to developing economies' sovereign risk. The credit structure in the euro zone is certainly dierent from that of developing countries studied by Ammer and Cai, especially in terms of overall liquidity, and may justify the dierence between our results and theirs. Our results are in line with Varga (2009) , who nds that Hungarian bond and CDS markets are in a close relationship, even though in the case of Hungary short term price discrepancies seem to be less persistent, and the CDS-bond basis uctuates around zero for the most part of the period under analysis.
The VECM estimation provides information about the dynamics of adjustment to the long term equilibrium between sovereign CDS and bond yield spreads. Deviations from the estimated long-run equilibrium persist longer than if market participants in one market could immediately observe the price in the other, consistent with the hypothesis of imperfections in the arbitrage relationship between the two markets. Following Gonzalo and Granger (1995), we construct a measure that reects the relative contribution of each market to price discovery. Our estimates for this measure over the whole sample suggests that the CDS market plays a leadership role in the Eurozone countries we study, where the derivative market for sovereign debt is overall rather liquid. As a whole, Granger Causality Test results do not seem to contradict the ndings of the VECM analysis, but they suggest a less clear-cut strong impact of past CDS information on bond yield spreads.
Due to its liquid nature, the Euro-area CDS market seems to move ahead of the corresponding bond market in price adjustment, both before and during the crisis. There is an alternative causal interpretation of our results. The CDS market may lead in price discovery because changes in CDS prices aect the fundamentals driving the prices of the underlying bonds.
If the CDS spread aects the cost of funding of the sovereign (or corporate), then a rise in the spread will not merely signal but will cause a deterioration in credit quality, hence a fall in the bond price (see Portes, 2010; Bilal and Singh, 2012) . Moreover, the change in spread may not signal at all: various non-fundamental determinants can aect the spreads (as in Tang and Yan, 2010) and therefore the fundamentals of the reference entity. To confront this hypothesis with the data will require a dynamic model admitting multiple equilibria.
Research along these lines is just beginning (e.g., Fostel and Geanakoplos, 2011). Table I The rst column displays test statistics for restrictions on parameter β of the cointegration vector. For all the six countries in the sample, the theoretical value β = 1 is rejected. Its value ranges from 0.78 to 1.66. The cointegration parameter β exceeds 1 for Austria, Belgium, and Italy meaning that, over the long run, a 1bps change in the CDS spread is accompanied by a larger change in the bond yield spread over the same reference entity.
This implies that the bond market seems to be the most volatile for these countries, while the opposite applies for Greece, Ireland and Portugal. The table shows the estimated values of the adjustment parameters of the two lags VECM estimated for each country in the sample. For Austria, Belgium, Greece, and Italy the parameters λ 1 and λ 2 are both signicant meaning that both markets contributed to the price discovery of these sovereign credit spreads. In contrast, for Ireland and Portugal the adjustment parameter λ 1 is not signicant meaning that it was primarily the sovereign CDS market where the price discovery of the credit spread took place. The corresponding bond yield spreads merely followed the change of the CDS spreads.
The last columns show the Gonzalo and Granger measure. It corresponds to the ratio of the speeds of adjustment in the two markets. When the Gonzalo and Granger measure is close to 1, it means that the CDS market plays a leading role in price discovery, and the bond market moves afterwards to correct for pricing discrepancies. When the measure is close to 50%, both markets contribute approximately equally to price discovery. When it is close to 0, the bond market leads the derivative market. For all the countries in the sample except for Greece the measure exceedes 50%, meaning that the CDS market leads price discovery more often than it adapts to the bond market valuation of credit risk. 
